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OPINION OF THE COURT  
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 For five days in September 2013, lane closures on the 
George Washington Bridge caused extraordinary traffic jams 
in Fort Lee, New Jersey.  The closures were allegedly 
orchestrated as revenge against the Mayor of Fort Lee for his 
refusal to endorse New Jersey Governor Christopher J. 
Christie in the Governor’s bid for reelection.  Political and 
legal consequences of the supposed retaliation have been 
extensively covered in local and national media, and, as if by 
some public reflex, the scandal has acquired a name with a “-
gate” suffix, being widely known as “Bridgegate.” 
 
 This appeal concerns the efforts of a “John Doe” to 
avoid being publicly identified as an unindicted co-
conspirator in the criminal case that federal prosecutors have 
brought against certain New Jersey government officials 
involved in Bridgegate.  A consortium of media groups took 
legal steps to force the disclosure of a letter, authored by one 
of the prosecutors, that purportedly identifies unindicted co-
conspirators, and the District Court ordered the letter to be 
disclosed.  Doe intervened and sought to block public access 
to the letter.  The Court denied his request and again ordered 
that it be disclosed.  Doe appealed, and we granted an 
emergency motion for a stay and for expedited consideration 
of this appeal. 
 
 Although the appeal arises out of a matter of high 
public interest, the issue presented is basic and undramatic.  
We must decide whether the letter is more akin to a bill of 
particulars or to a discovery disclosure in a criminal case.  
That distinction is dispositive, because the former is subject 
to a recognized right of public access while the latter has 
historically been kept from public view.  See United States v. 
Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985).  Because we conclude 
that the letter in question is a part of the general discovery 
process, it is not subject to any First Amendment or common 
law right of public access, and we will vacate the District 
Court’s order insofar as it requires the letter to be publicly 
disclosed. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 On April 23, 2015, a grand jury returned a nine-count 
indictment against William E. Baroni Jr. and Bridget Anne 
Kelly based on the Bridgegate political payback scheme.  See 
United States v. Baroni, No. 15-cr-193 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 23, 
2015).1  With the exception of Count 9, the indictment alleges 
that Baroni and Kelly committed their offenses with 
unidentified “others.”  The only other individual identified by 
name in that indictment is David Wildstein, who has already 
pled guilty in a separate criminal case to two charges arising 
from Bridgegate.  See United States v. Wildstein, No. 15-cr-
209 (D.N.J. filed May 1, 2015).  Wildstein is awaiting 
sentencing.  The charges against Baroni and Kelly are still 
pending. 
                                              
 1 The indictment charged Baroni and Kelly with 
conspiracy to misapply and the misapplication of government 
property (Counts 1 and 2), conspiracy to commit and the 
commission of wire fraud (Counts 3 through 7), and 
conspiracy against and the deprivation of civil rights (Counts 
8 and 9).   
 
 Following their indictment, Baroni and Kelly filed 
omnibus motions for discovery of certain information.2  They 
also filed motions for a bill of particulars,3 seeking the 
identity of the unindicted co-conspirators referenced as 
“others” in the indictment.  Specifically, Kelly asked that the 
government be ordered to provide “the identities of any and 
all undisclosed or unindicted co-conspirators, aiders and 
abettors, and/or any other individuals involved in any and all 
alleged criminal activity.” (A-107.)  Baroni likewise sought 
the identity “of all unindicted co-conspirators,” as well as 
“the names of the ‘others’ referred to in the Indictment.” (A-
115.) 
 
 The government opposed those requests.  It argued that 
the motions for a bill of particulars should be denied because 
voluminous discovery and the detailed indictment had already 
given the defendants more than enough information about the 
criminal charges to allow them to prepare a defense.  In the 
government’s view, the defendants were “ask[ing] the United 
                                              
 2 Discovery in the Baroni and Kelly criminal matter is 
subject to a protective order.  The protective order applies to 
“confidential discovery materials,” which includes (among 
other things) “information of a personal nature.”  Order 
Granting Motion for Protective Order at 1, United States v. 
Baroni, No. 15-cr-193 (D.N.J. Jul. 7, 2015), ECF No. 22. 
 
 3 A “bill of particulars” is “[a] formal, detailed 
statement of the claims or charges brought by a plaintiff or a 
prosecutor, usu[ally] filed in response to the defendant’s 
request for a more specific complaint.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
States to reveal much of its trial strategy and prematurely 
commit to specific evidentiary proofs.”  (A-136.)  
Nevertheless, the government said that it would, “in a 
document to be filed under seal, identify any other individual 
about whom [it] has sufficient evidence to designate as 
having joined the conspiracy.”  (A-141.) 
 
 On January 11, 2016, as promised, the government 
produced to the defendants the “Conspirator Letter,” 
revealing the names of any individuals the government 
regarded as having joined the conspiracy.  At the same time, 
while it did not make a formal motion to seal the Letter, the 
government sent a copy to the chambers of the judge 
presiding in the case and “ask[ed] the Court to permanently 
shield its disclosure from public view given the ‘sensitive 
nature’ of the information contained therein.”  (A-148.)4  The 
Letter was not, it seems, ever filed with the Clerk of the 
District Court.  The day after submission of the Conspirator 
Letter, Baroni objected to its being sealed and the manner in 
which the government had submitted it to the Court. 
 
 The government filed a response to Baroni’s objection.  
In requesting that the Conspirator Letter be kept under seal, 
the government cited a set of Department of Justice 
instructions called the “U.S. Attorney’s Manual,” which 
directs prosecutors to “avoid unnecessary public references to 
wrongdoing by uncharged third-parties.”  (A-150.)  While it 
thus justified maintaining the Letter’s secrecy, the 
government at the same time recognized that the Court might 
                                              
 4 This description is taken from a letter filed by 
Baroni’s attorney on January 12, 2016, objecting to the 
government’s request to the Court.  
later be required to rule on a request for public disclosure.  
“As is always the case,” the government said, “if Baroni, 
Kelly, or the [g]overnment articulates a sufficient reason for 
unsealing [the Letter] at any point in the prosecution, the 
Court then will address that issue.”  (A-151.)  The 
government summed up its position by saying, “[o]ur request 
that the Court maintain the [g]overnment’s letter and its 
contents under seal is consistent with departmental guidance, 
decisional law, and the common sense proposition that 
publicizing allegations of wrongdoing by uncharged third 
parties should be avoided.”  (A-152.) 
 
 The District Court never issued an order directing the 
government to file a bill of particulars.  After the Conspirator 
Letter was provided to the defense, a hearing was held to 
address any lingering issues from the omnibus motions.  
Baroni’s counsel indicated that his request for information 
about unindicted co-conspirators was “still alive, but because 
of other motions that are pending, [he could not] talk about it 
[at that time].”  (A-166.)  The Court noted that it did not need 
to rule on any motions “unless [the parties] ha[d] an issue 
going forward.”  (A-165.)  No further discussion was 
dedicated to the subject.  Immediately after the hearing, the 
District Court issued an order granting additional relief on the 
defendants’ various motions, but it also ordered “that the 
remainder of [d]efendants’ Discovery Motions” – which 
included the motions for a bill of particulars – “are 
DISMISSED AS MOOT as per counsels’ representations 
and the discussion on the record.”  (A-184 (original 
emphasis).) 
 
 Meanwhile, “[s]hortly after the [g]overnment 
represented that it would produce the Conspirator Letter to 
the defendants, the media began reporting about” its 
existence. (Opening Br. at 10.)  On January 13, 2016 – two 
days after the government gave the Letter to the defendants – 
a consortium of news organizations (collectively, “the 
Media”)5 filed a motion to intervene in the criminal case and 
for access to the Letter.6  Among other things, the Media 
sought “[t]he [g]overnment’s response to a Motion for a Bill 
of Particulars, including a list of unindicted co-conspirators 
emailed to the Court and Defense counsel on January 11, 
2016.”  Notice of Motion to Intervene and for Other Relief at 
2, N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. United States, No. 16-cv-267 
(D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2016), ECF No. 1. 
 
 The government, consistent with its request that the 
Letter be maintained under seal, did not oppose the Media’s 
intervention but did oppose any disclosure of the Conspirator 
Letter, arguing that “public disclosure of the information 
                                              
 5 Those organizations include: North Jersey Media 
Group Inc., publishers of Northjersey.com as well as The 
Record and The Herald News; Bloomberg L.P., the owner 
and operator of Bloomberg News; NBCUniversal Media, 
LLC d/b/a WNBC-TV Channel 4; The New York Times 
Company; New Jersey Advance Media, publishers of nj.com; 
Dow Jones & Company, Inc., the publisher of The Wall 
Street Journal; the Associated Press; Public Media NJ, Inc. 
d/b/a NJTV; New York Public Radio; American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc.; Philadelphia Media network; PBC; and the 
website Politico. 
 
 6 The Media’s motion to intervene in the criminal case 
was then assigned a separate civil action number, under 
which the case has proceeded since that time.   
contained in the [C]onspirator Letter is unwarranted at this 
phase of the prosecution.”  (A-187.)  It recognized that 
“evidence relating to even uncharged coconspirators may take 
on significance at a conspiracy trial.”  (A-188.)  For example, 
the identity of unindicted co-conspirators could become 
relevant at trial “if the [g]overnment moves for the admission 
of an out-of-court statement made in furtherance of the 
conspiracy by an unindicted coconspirator under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).”  (A-188.)  But, absent the need for 
such a disclosure of unindicted co-conspirators, the 
government asserted that the Conspirator Letter “has no 
evidentiary value” (A-188), and that “Department of Justice 
policy directs federal prosecutors to avoid unnecessary public 
references to wrongdoing by uncharged third parties.”  (A-
189.)  According to the government, the Letter was 
“communicated to [d]efendants only for purposes of trial 
preparation” and, unlike a formal bill of particulars, had “no 
adjudicatory significance at this point.”  (A-193.)  In 
recognition of the rights of the unindicted co-conspirators 
themselves, the government emphasized that they are not 
charged and so “have no opportunity to challenge that 
potentially injurious designation in court.”  (A-189.) 
 
 On May 10, 2016, the District Court granted the 
Media’s motion and ordered the disclosure of the Conspirator 
Letter.  See N. Jersey Media Grp. v. United States, No. 16-cv-
267, 2016 WL 2660104 (D.N.J. May 10, 2016).  It reasoned 
that the Letter was equivalent to a bill of particulars, to which 
a right of access has historically attached.  Id. at *2.  The 
Court then weighed the privacy interests of the unindicted co-
conspirators against the public interest in disclosure and 
concluded that the balance weighed in favor of disclosure.  Id. 
at *3.  As to the privacy interests, the Court emphasized that 
“[t]he underlying events that gave rise to the Indictment have 
been extensively covered by the media, such that even 
persons tangentially involved have already been identified 
and exposed in the press.”  Id.  Also, said the Court, 
individuals “thus far identified” as being involved in 
Bridgegate have been public employees or appointed 
officials, so their privacy interests are significantly limited.  
Id.  The Court ordered that the Conspirator Letter be 
disclosed by noon on May 13, 2016.   
 
 Then John Doe intervened.7  He says that, up to that 
point, he had “relied on the [g]overnment and its obligation 
under the [U.S. Attorney’s Manual] to vindicate his 
constitutional and reputational rights against being publicly 
branded a criminal without a forum to contest those 
accusations.”  (Opening Br. at 15.)  But, after the May 10th 
order that the Letter be disclosed, he believed the government 
“was no longer adequately representing his rights, especially 
in light of its apparent intention not to appeal the court’s 
order.”  (Id.)  Doe thus filed his emergency motion to 
intervene, to proceed anonymously, and to stay the release of 
the Conspirator Letter.  In his motion, he made the same 
arguments he makes now: that no right of access requires 
                                              
 7 Doe says that he “has not seen and does not have 
access to the Conspirator Letter.”  (Opening Br. at 16 n.5.)  
The government has clarified that Doe’s name does, in fact, 
appear in the letter: “John Doe has standing for purposes of 
this appeal because the [g]overnment’s letter to defense 
counsel in the criminal case identifies him as an unindicted 
coconspirator.”  (United States’s Second Letter re: Oral 
Argument, filed May 20, 2016, at 1.) 
disclosure of the Conspirator Letter, and that identifying him 
as a co-conspirator would violate his due process rights. 
 
 The next day, May 13, 2016, the District Court granted 
Doe’s motion to intervene and his request to proceed 
anonymously, but denied his motion for a stay.  See N. Jersey 
Media Grp., Inc. v. United States, No. 16-cv-267, 2016 WL 
2771805 (D.N.J. May 13, 2016).  It concluded that he had not 
shown any likelihood of success on the merits of his request 
that the Conspirator Letter remain sealed.  According to the 
Court, “the Conspirator Letter was submitted … in response 
to [d]efendants’ motions for bills of particulars.”  (A-34.)  A 
copy was sent to the Court, but “[t]he document was never 
labeled a courtesy copy, nor has the [g]overnment included 
th[e] Court in other exchanges of mere discovery material.”  
(Id.)  As a consequence, the District Court “deemed the 
Conspirator Letter a judicial record … .”  (Id.)  As to Doe’s 
due process argument, the Court held that any due process 
interest was satisfied because Doe “ha[d] been heard by th[e] 
Court” in his request for nondisclosure.  (Id.) 
 
 Doe promptly filed a notice of appeal from the May 10 
and May 13 orders.  We granted his emergency motion for a 
stay of the District Court’s order pending appeal and for 
expedited consideration of his case. 
 
II. DISCUSSION8 
 
 The Media has asserted a right of access to the 
Conspirator Letter under both the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and under common law.  Doe and 
the government say that, on this record, there is no such 
right.9 
                                              
 8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331; we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
 
 9 The Media also make two “waiver” arguments, 
which warrant little comment.  First, they claim that “Doe is 
barred from arguing for the first time on appeal that this 
matter is not governed by this Court’s decision in Smith” 
because he did not raise that argument below.  (Media 
Answering Br. at 46.)  In fact, Doe made that exact argument 
below.  He first argued that “the Conspirator Letter is not a 
bill of particulars or any other judicial filing to which the 
public’s presumptive right of access attaches; rather, it is 
nothing more than a discovery letter that should have been 
sent to the criminal defendants without being filed.”  (District 
Ct. Docket, No. 37-1 at 9 (original emphasis).)  Directly after 
that sentence, Doe used a “compare” signal to cite Smith, a 
case described in greater detail herein.  Doe emphasized that 
the district court in that case, unlike here, had “granted the 
criminal defendants motion for a bill of particulars” and the 
responsive document had been filed with the Clerk of that 
Court.  (Id.)  In both distinguishing Smith and arguing that the 
Conspirator Letter is a discovery response rather than a bill of 
particulars, Doe raised the precise issue we now address.  
Second, the Media argues that “the [g]overnment should be 
 A. The First Amendment Right of Access10 
 
 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment guarantees the 
public, and thus the press, a right of access to criminal 
proceedings.  448 U.S. 555 (1980).  That right of access can 
include documents involved in the proceedings.  See Smith, 
776 F.2d at 1111-12.  Assessing the right of access “requires 
                                                                                                     
estopped from adopting new arguments it failed to raise 
below.”  (Media Sur-Reply Br. at 1.)  Any such arguments – 
even assuming that the government did not advance them 
below and that estoppel might apply – are properly before us 
anyway, since Doe has advanced them consistently 
throughout this litigation. 
 
 10 In general, decisions to seal documents related to 
judicial proceedings are subject to review for an abuse of 
discretion.  Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 
1071 (3d Cir. 1984).  In the First Amendment context, 
however, a right of access claim is subject to “substantially 
broader review.”  In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application 
for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 
1990).  “This broader review includes independent 
consideration of the district court’s order and the factual 
findings inferred from the evidence before it.”  Id.  “In the 
First Amendment context … the Supreme Court has 
recognized the duty of reviewing courts to engage in an 
independent factual review of the full record.  Thus we have 
explained that when we address a right of access claim, our 
scope of review is substantially broader than that for abuse of 
discretion.”  United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1357 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (internal citation and footnote omitted). 
a two-prong evaluation of ‘whether the place and process 
have historically been open to the press’ and ‘whether public 
access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of 
the particular process in question.’”  PG Pub. Co. v. Aichele, 
705 F.3d 91, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 8 
(1986)).  The first part of that test – generally referred to as 
the “experience” prong – calls for, as the Court noted, a 
consideration of whether there has been a tradition of opening 
to the press the matter in question.  United States v. Wecht, 
537 F.3d 222, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008).  The second part – 
called the “logic” prong – considers whether public access 
plays a positive role in the judicial process by, inter alia, 
“enhancing both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the 
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the 
system.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Where 
both prongs of the test are satisfied, a qualified First 
Amendment right of public access attaches.”  Aichele, 705 
F.3d at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted).  If that right 
attaches, it gives rise to a strong presumption of access, which 
“may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on 
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and 
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”  Press-Enterprise, 
478 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 As to the “experience” prong, the Media argue that the 
Conspirator Letter is akin to a bill of particulars to which the 
right of access would unquestionably attach.  They are right 
that our precedent does grant public access to bills of 
particulars, see Smith, 776 F.2d at 1112 (“[A]ccess to bills of 
particulars is protected by the First Amendment.”), but the 
term “bill of particulars” does not cover each and every 
document that provides additional information about a 
criminal charge.  A bill of particulars is of a specific nature, 
and its status has legal consequences.  As earlier noted, supra 
note 3, “[a] bill of particulars is a formal written statement by 
the prosecutor providing details of the charges against the 
defendant.”  1 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 130 (4th ed. 2016).  
It effectively narrows the government’s case at trial in the 
same way as the formal charging document: “there can be no 
variance between the notice given in a bill of particulars and 
the evidence at trial.”  Smith, 776 F.2d at 1111; see also 
United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 819 (2d Cir. 1962) 
(“[T]he government is strictly limited to proving what it has 
set forth in [a bill of particulars].”).  In many instances, a bill 
of particulars provides information that ought to have been in 
the indictment in the first place and so protects the defendant 
by “preclud[ing] double jeopardy,” shielding the defendant 
from a second trial for the same acts.  United States v. GAF 
Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United 
States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 771 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
 Doe and the government take the position that the 
Conspirator Letter is not a bill of particulars at all but is 
instead an item of pretrial discovery, to which the First 
Amendment right of access has not historically been applied.  
See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) 
(“[R]estraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, 
information are not a restriction on a traditionally public 
source of information.”).  “With respect to experience, there 
is no tradition of access to criminal discovery.  To the 
contrary, discovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a 
private process because the litigants and the courts assume 
that the sole purpose of discovery is to assist trial 
preparation.”  United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United 
States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(“Historically, discovery materials were not available to the 
public or press.”).11 
 
 This difference of opinion over the character of the 
Conspirator Letter is no mere battle over labels.  It is the issue 
that, at least on the constitutional point, decides this case.  
Determining whether the Conspirator Letter is the sort of 
document that would historically have been available to the 
public, and thus would satisfy the “experience” prong of the 
First Amendment inquiry, turns on whether it is more 
properly thought of as discovery material or as a bill of 
particulars. 
 
 Our opinion in United States v. Smith is our only 
previous effort to grapple with a pretrial request for public 
disclosure of unindicted co-conspirator information at a 
similar stage in a criminal prosecution.  776 F.2d at 1112.  
Although Smith ultimately concluded that the document at 
issue there should not be disclosed, it nonetheless held that 
both the First Amendment and common law rights of access 
apply to bills of particulars.  Id. at 1112-13.  The defendants 
in that case moved for a bill of particulars on various issues, 
including a request for the names of unindicted co-
conspirators.  Id. at 1105.  Unlike here, the district court in 
Smith actually granted the motion and ordered that the 
government provide a bill of particulars listing the names of 
unindicted co-conspirators.  See id. at 1105-06.  Also unlike 
                                              
 11 See also United States v. Benzer, No. 2:13-cr-18, 
2015 WL 9200365, at *4 (D. Nev. Dec. 15, 2015) (collecting 
authorities concluding that there is “no traditional right of 
access to pretrial discovery”). 
here, the government formally “filed [that] list of names in 
response to th[e] order and the Clerk placed the document 
under seal.”  Id. at 1106.  Two newspapers then intervened 
and moved to unseal the list. 
 
 Under those circumstances, we considered the list to 
be a bill of particulars and we held that the First Amendment 
right of access applied.  We first emphasized the importance 
of ensuring the public’s access to the charging documents in a 
criminal case: 
 
Th[e] historic tradition of public access to the 
charging document in a criminal case reflects 
the importance of its role in the criminal trial 
process and the public’s interest in knowing its 
contents.  It sets forth the charge or charges to 
be tried and … thereby establishes the general 
parameters of the government’s case.  
Knowledge of the charge or charges is essential 
to an understanding of the trial, essential to an 
evaluation of the performance of counsel and 
the court, and, most importantly, essential to an 
appraisal of the fairness of the criminal process 
to the accused. 
 
Id. at 1112.  We then noted that, “[h]istorically and 
functionally, the bill of particulars is closely related to the 
indictment.”  Id. at 1111.  Bills of particulars are regarded as 
“supplements to the indictment rather than as pretrial 
discovery.”  Id.  “[I]mportantly, a bill of particulars, like the 
indictment, is designed to define and limit the government’s 
case.  As with the indictment, there can be no variance 
between the notice given in a bill of particulars and the 
evidence at trial.”  Id.  In short, a public right of access 
attaches to a bill of particulars because the bill serves the 
same purpose and has the same legal effect as a charging 
document, to which the right of access unquestionably 
attaches.  The very function it serves – as a supplement to the 
indictment – is what suggests generally open access to it.12 
 
 Here, for at least four reasons, the Conspirator Letter 
does not share the attributes of a bill of particulars and so 
stands in contrast to the document in Smith.  First, the 
government did not treat it as a bill of particulars.  In the 
government’s words, it “conceptualized and treated the Letter 
as a vehicle for voluntarily delivering discovery to 
[d]efendants rather than as a formal bill of particulars that 
was ordered by the District Court.  Indeed, the [g]overnment 
objected strongly to [d]efendants’ request for a bill of 
particulars in its opposition to [d]efendants’ discovery 
motions.”  (USA Answering Br. at 13.)  When the defendants 
moved for a bill of particulars, the government outlined – in 
great detail13 – why such a binding document is unnecessary 
in this case. 
                                              
 12 In the end, Smith determined that the list should 
remain sealed to protect the named persons’ reputation and 
privacy interests.  776 F.2d at 1113-15.  We need not weigh 
the public and private interests at stake in this case, however, 
because – unlike in Smith – we conclude that there is no 
presumptive right of access to the document in question. 
 
 13 The government’s response to the motions for bills 
of particulars included a section entitled: “Defendants’ 
motions for bills of particulars should be denied.”  (A-136.)  
In that section, the government argued extensively that a bill 
 
 We recognize that the government may have avoided 
this entire dispute by stating, when it gave the Letter, that 
doing so was a matter of discovery and not a response to the 
request for a bill of particulars.  It did not do that.14  But, 
                                                                                                     
of particulars was not required, correctly citing the standards 
for determining whether a bill of particulars was necessary.  It 
summarized its argument as follows: 
The circumstances of this case obviate the 
professed need for additional clarity with 
respect to the allegations in the Indictment. 
Count One of the Indictment is 26 pages long, 
and provides a wealth of detailed information 
about the nature of the charged conspiracy and 
[d]efendants’ specific roles in carrying out its 
aims.  Moreover, discovery in this case has been 
extensive, and [d]efendants have had at their 
disposal for some time documentary evidence 
that will be used by the [g]overnment to prove 
its case. Indeed, one of [d]efendants’ complaints 
is that the [g]overnment has provided too much 
discovery. 
(A-139.)  It would require a painfully strained reading of that 
response to regard it as demonstrating the government’s 
acquiescence and agreement to provide the Defendants with 
the bill of particulars that they were seeking. 
 
 14 The government has conceded in its briefing that it 
“could have made clearer to the District Court that the 
[C]onspirator Letter was a discovery letter, not a bill of 
particulars,” and it reiterated that concession at oral argument.  
(USA Answering Br. at 6 n.2.)  We wholeheartedly agree.  In 
despite that failing, more than is present on this record is 
needed to persuade us that the Conspirator Letter was actually 
(and unbeknownst to the government) a bill of particulars, 
when the prosecutors believed and stated that they were 
agreeing only to share a limited set of information, the sort of 
“informal correspondence” that is regularly “communicat[ed] 
between the parties” to a criminal case in fulfillment of 
discovery obligations.  (A-186.)  The government was willing 
to give the Conspirator Letter to the defendants to assist them 
in trial preparation, but it was not bargaining for the 
constraints that would be triggered by the filing of a bill of 
particulars.15  Of course, the government cannot avoid the 
                                                                                                     
fact, it muddied the waters by citing a portion of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Manual that said, “[w]ith respect to bills of 
particulars that identify unindicted co-conspirators, 
prosecutors generally should seek leave to file such 
documents under seal.”  (A-192-93.)  While we disagree with 
the District Court’s conclusion about the status of the 
Conspirator Letter, the government certainly should have 
been more explicit at the time of the disclosure that it was 
providing the letter as discovery material only and that it did 
not intend the letter to function as a bill of particulars. 
 
 15 There are legitimate reasons why the defendants 
would want to know whom the government considered 
unindicted co-conspirators to be, even if the information did 
not serve the function of a bill of particulars.  For example, 
during a trial, the government could potentially try to admit 
into evidence any co-conspirator statements under the hearsay 
exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).  The 
defendants would therefore be well-served to know whose 
statements might be used against them.  Similarly, each 
legal consequences associated with a bill of particulars 
merely by calling the document something else, but its 
understanding of the character of its own filing is significant.  
Here, that understanding was that the Conspirator Letter was 
nothing more than discovery material. 
 
 The second reason for concluding that the Letter is no 
bill of particulars is that, prior to the Media’s motion for 
access, the District Court did not treat it as such.  The Court 
did not characterize the Conspirator Letter as a bill of 
particulars at the time it was turned over, and never ordered 
the government to file a bill of particulars, as occurred in 
Smith.16   
                                                                                                     
participant in a conspiracy is liable for the actions of co-
conspirators when such actions are undertaken in furtherance 
of the goals of the conspiracy.  See Pinkerton v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946).  As a consequence, if the 
defendants know whom the government regards as a co-
conspirator, they also know whose conduct might potentially 
be attributed to them. 
 
 16 The Media cite a handful of cases in their brief in 
which the government has provided bills of particulars 
without court order.   See, e.g., United States v. Cont’l Grp., 
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 704, 707 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (referring to a 
“Voluntary Bill of Particulars”).  We agree with the Media’s 
contention that a bill of particulars can be provided without 
court order.  Even Doe acknowledges that the government 
can “conced[e] a motion for a bill of particulars and fil[e] that 
bill.”  (Doe Reply Br. at 10.)  But that only happens with the 
government’s agreement to voluntarily provide a formal bill, 
 
 The third reason is that the defendants also did not 
behave as though they believed the Conspirator Letter served 
as a bill of particulars.  One would have expected them to 
insist on the filing of the Conspirator Letter, if it were to be 
treated as a bill of particulars, yet the Conspirator Letter was 
never filed with the Clerk.17  It was emailed directly to the 
District Court judge because of the government’s 
understandable desire “to protect the sensitive information 
contained in the [C]onspirator Letter by asking the District 
Court to seal it.”  (USA Answering Br. at 15.) 
 
 Fourth and finally, the Conspirator Letter simply does 
not serve the purpose of a bill of particulars.  That purpose is 
                                                                                                     
which we would expect would be signaled by styling the 
document as such. 
 
 17 According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
7(f), “[t]he court may direct the government to file a bill of 
particulars.”  In Smith, we noted that Rule 7(f)’s reference to 
the government’s need to “file” a bill of particulars weighed 
in favor of treating it as a supplement to the indictment rather 
than pretrial discovery, since Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16 provides that discovery need only be disclosed 
directly to the defendant in a criminal case.  776 F.2d at 1111. 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49(d) states that 
filings in criminal actions are governed by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 5(d)(2), which states: “A paper is filed by 
delivering it: (A) to the clerk; or (B) to a judge who agrees to 
accept it for filing, and who must then note the filing date on 
the paper and promptly send it to the clerk.”  Neither 
happened here. 
to fill in the holes in an indictment when “the indictment itself 
is too vague and indefinite … to inform the defendant of the 
nature of the charges brought against him.”  United States v. 
Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted).  The rules of criminal 
procedure require an indictment to be concise.  Id.  The need 
for concision, though, does not excuse the omission of 
information necessary to inform defendants of the charges 
against them and to safeguard their rights against double 
jeopardy.  A bill of particulars can fix such flaws.  The 
indictment in this case, however, did not require that kind of 
repair.  On the contrary, the indictment is quite specific, 
running thirty-six pages and setting out the alleged role of 
each defendant with specificity.  It gives the defendants more 
than enough information to make them aware of the crimes 
with which they are charged and allows them to prepare a 
defense.  The Media rightly agreed at oral argument that the 
indictment against Baroni and Kelly is detailed.  And that 
level of detail is the very thing that prevents any credible 
claim that the defendants needed a bill of particulars. 
 
 The dividing line between a bill of particulars and 
pretrial discovery may not always be clear, but it is in this 
instance.  Despite the Media’s protestations, the mere fact that 
the Conspirator Letter includes information that could also 
have been included in a bill of particulars does not turn it into 
one.  Nor does the existence of a motion for a bill of 
particulars mean that all information flowing from the 
government must be treated as a response to the motion.  The 
legal significance of a bill of particulars – supplementing and 
narrowing the charging document, and thus affecting the 
government’s case at trial – is not something to be lightly 
created by implication.  As in Smith, there may be instances 
in which an indictment charging a conspiracy is so overbroad 
or vaguely drafted that a bill of particulars identifying 
unindicted co-conspirators is required to allow the defendant 
to prepare a defense.  Considering the detail of this 
indictment, however, that is not a problem here.   
 
 In sum, the Conspirator Letter is not a bill of 
particulars because the government did not regard it as one, 
the Court did not order one, the defendants did not behave as 
though they had received one, and the Letter itself did not 
serve the purpose of one.  The “experience” prong of the First 
Amendment inquiry thus weighs against applying a 
presumptive right of access to the Conspirator Letter. 
 
 That conclusion suffices to end the First Amendment 
analysis, but, in the alternative, we note that the second, or 
“logic,” prong of the analysis – whether public access plays a 
meaningfully positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question – also weighs in Doe’s favor.  The lack of 
adjudicatory significance of the Letter is manifest in two 
ways.  First, as just discussed, it is not needed to address any 
shortcomings in the indictment and so to avoid unfairness in 
the criminal proceedings.  Second, the document – at least at 
this stage of the proceedings – has no evidentiary 
significance.  The government rightly acknowledges that 
there may come a point when the information in the Letter 
becomes important, but it is speculative to say it ever will, 
and a chance of significance is not the same as significance. 
 
 “Information wants to be free” is, in some quarters, a 
popular slogan, but there are dangers to the administration of 
justice in too freely granting access to information of the sort 
at issue here.  “For one, the purpose of the discovery rules – 
to … avoid unnecessary surprise and to level the playing field 
– might be undermined.”  United States v. Smith, 985 F. 
Supp. 2d 506, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  “And, because the 
discovery rules are reciprocal, there is the risk that unfettered 
public access could jeopardize a defendant’s trial strategy.”  
Id. 
 
 Moreover, were we to apply a right of access in this 
case, it could stunt future efforts by prosecutors to resolve 
pretrial discovery disputes and motions practice without 
having to involve the district courts.  The prosecution chose 
to satisfy Baroni and Kelly’s request to know whom the 
government considered to be co-conspirators.  See supra note 
15.  It did so voluntarily, without court order.  To now impose 
a legal obligation on the government to comport its proof at 
trial with its voluntary submission could well chill similar 
efforts by the government in the future to moot pretrial 
motions through voluntary disclosure.  That result would be 
much to the detriment of future defendants, who would 
probably receive less information in discovery than they 
currently do and would require judicial resolution of more 
discovery disputes.  The government emphasized those risks 
at oral argument, and we agree they are real.  We therefore 
conclude that logic weighs against a First Amendment right 
of access to pretrial discovery materials like the Conspirator 
Letter. 
 
 That leaves for consideration only the Media’s claim 
of a common law right of access to the Letter. 
 B. The Common Law Right of Access18 
 
 “We have previously recognized a right of access to 
judicial proceedings and judicial records, and this right of 
access is beyond dispute.”  Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 
23 F.3d 772, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 
589 (1978) (recognizing that, in the context of criminal 
proceedings, the press has a historically-based, common law 
right of access to judicial records and documents).  That right 
is rooted in common law and predates the Constitution.  Bank 
of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 
800 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1986).  It is, however, narrower 
than the First Amendment right we have just discussed, being 
focused on the specific question of “whether [the document at 
issue] is considered to be a ‘judicial record.’”  In re Cendant 
Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001).  And the answer to 
that question “depends on whether [the] document has been 
filed with the court, or otherwise somehow incorporated or 
integrated into a district court’s adjudicatory proceedings.”  
Id.  A document may also be considered a “judicial record” 
absent formal filing, in limited circumstances, “if a court 
interprets or enforces the terms of that document, or requires 
that it be submitted to the court under seal.”  Id. 
 
 In Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, 
Inc., we noted that “[n]umerous other courts have … 
recognized the principle that the filing of a document gives 
                                              
 18 “We review decisions relating to the common law 
right of access generally for abuse of discretion, though our 
review of the legal principles applied is plenary.”  Wecht, 484 
F.3d at 208. 
rise to a presumptive right of public access.”  998 F.2d 157, 
161-62 (3d Cir. 1993).  The act of filing, in fact, seems to be 
the most significant consideration, as is evident in situations 
in which we have previously granted the right of access.  For 
example, we have done so with papers filed in connection 
with a motion for summary judgment, Republic of Philippines 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660-62 (3d Cir. 
1991), transcripts of civil trials and exhibits admitted at trials, 
Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678-80 (3d Cir. 1988), 
and transcripts of a hearing for a preliminary injunction, 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
 
 But we have also held that the filing of a document 
does not, on its own, bring that document within the common 
law right of access.  In Leucadia, we said that “there is a 
presumptive right to public access to all material filed in 
connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, whether these 
motions are case dispositive or not, but no such right as to 
discovery motions and their supporting documents.”  998 
F.2d at 165 (emphasis added).  That case thus recognized the 
longstanding limitation on the public’s access to discovery 
materials and so limited the common law right of access, even 
when discovery motions and their supporting documents are 
filed with the court.  A contrary ruling, we noted, “would 
make raw discovery, ordinarily inaccessible to the public, 
accessible merely because it had to be included in motions 
precipitated by inadequate discovery responses or overly 
aggressive discovery demands. This would be a holding based 
more on expediency than principle.”  Id. at 164.  Inclusion in 
a judicial filing, therefore, does not necessarily bring filed 
discovery materials within the scope of the common law right 
of access.  See Wecht, 484 F.3d at 209 (“[D]ocuments filed 
with the court are generally subject to the common law right 
of access, unless attached to a discovery motion.”). 
 
 Here, it seems, the Conspirator Letter was not filed 
with the Clerk’s Office but was emailed directly to the 
District Court judge to ensure that the defendants would feel 
some threat of adverse consequences from the Court if the 
Letter were leaked to the press.19  The government contends 
that “[t]he mere act of submitting a document to the court as 
part of a request to seal that same document should not 
convert the document into a judicial record to which a 
presumptive right of access attaches.”  (USA Answering Br. 
at 15.)  By the government’s lights, “[i]t would be beyond 
ironic if an act taken to safeguard certain information from 
premature public disclosure inadvertently triggered the 
public’s right to access that information.”  (Id. at 16.) 
 
 Even accepting, for the moment, the notion that 
emailing a document directly to a judge, without filing it with 
the Clerk, can be regarded as a formal “filing,” that step was 
not sufficient to bring the Letter within the common law right 
of access.  For the reasons we have described at length, the 
Conspirator Letter is properly categorized as pretrial 
discovery and thus falls under our holding in Leucadia: 
discovery materials that are part of judicial filings are 
generally not “judicial records” and do not fall within the 
common law right of access.  The fact of filing is one point to 
                                              
 19 We question the government’s decision to email the 
Conspirator Letter directly to the judge in lieu of a formal 
filing.  We do not gainsay the concern that motivated that 
decision, but permission should have been sought from the 
District Court first. 
consider but it cannot be the sole basis for applying the right 
of access. 
 
 The test is more functional than that.  “[T]he issue of 
whether a document is a judicial record should turn on the use 
the court has made of it rather than on whether it has found its 
way into the clerk’s file.”  Pansy, 23 F.3d at 783.  To be 
considered a judicial record, to which the common law right 
of access properly attaches, “the item filed must be relevant to 
the performance of the judicial function and useful in the 
judicial process in order for it to be designated a judicial 
document.”  United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d 
Cir. 1995).  In light of its present lack of adjudicatory 
significance, the Conspirator Letter plays no part in the 
judicial function or process.  The Letter was intended as an 
aid to the defense, not as an aid to the judge in rendering a 
decision or for some other judicial purpose.  “The court was 
merely the passive repository of the letter and needed to do 
nothing with it” at the time it was submitted.  (USA 
Answering Br. at 15.)  The only reason for sending it to the 
judge was to ensure that it would be protected from public 
disclosure.  We agree with the government that it would be a 
sad irony if that step – done for the purpose of protecting the 
document from disclosure – somehow meant that the letter 
was now unavoidably in the public realm.  We therefore hold 
that the Conspirator Letter is not a judicial record to which 
the common law right of access attaches.20 
                                              
 20 Doe also raises a due process challenge to the 
disclosure of the Conspirator Letter, but we do not need to 
consider Doe’s due process rights to resolve the instant 
appeal.  See New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of 
Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 301 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 Public access to judicial documents and court 
proceedings is a respected tradition and important legal 
principle, but it has bounds.  “[D]iscovery traditionally has 
been conducted by the parties in private and has not been 
publically available.”  Wecht, 484 F.3d at 208.  That is so 
even in a case affected by heightened public interest.  The 
time may come, perhaps at trial, when the information in the 
Conspirator Letter ought to be made public, but that time is 
not here yet.  Because neither the First Amendment right of 
access nor the common law right of access applies to the 
Conspirator Letter, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
insofar as it requires disclosure of the Letter.21 
                                                                                                     
an obligation not to decide constitutional questions unless 
necessary.”).  We thus decline to address that argument.  We 
also will not address the Media’s argument about the 
timeliness of Doe’s motion to intervene.  The Media contend 
that Doe “had every chance” to intervene earlier, “but instead 
sat on his hands” (Media Answering Br. at 14), so his “late 
application is barred” (id. at 43).  The utterly undeveloped 
character of the Media’s protestations about the timeliness of 
intervention means that the argument is waived.  John Wyeth 
& Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 
(3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J.) (“[A]rguments raised in passing … 
are considered waived.”). 
 
 21 Doe also appealed from the District Court’s order, 
dated May 13, 2016, denying his request for a stay pending 
appeal of its order requiring the release of the Conspirator 
Letter.  We will dismiss Doe’s appeal of that order as moot, 
both because we have previously granted Doe’s request for a 
                                                                                                     
stay pending appeal and because, by vacating the District 
Court’s underlying order that Doe had sought to stay, there is 
now no pending prospect that the Conspirator Letter will be 
released. 
 In a motion for reconsideration dated May 17, 2016, 
the Media sought release of the Conspirator Letter with Doe’s 
name redacted.  Having concluded that the entire Conspirator 
Letter is not subject to any public right of access, we discern 
no basis for the Media’s request for its partial disclosure.  As 
we have explained, the Media has no right of access to 
pretrial discovery, which includes the entirety of the 
Conspirator Letter.  Accordingly, we will deny the Media’s 
motion for reconsideration insofar as it requests a redacted 
version of the Conspirator Letter. 
